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INFLATION. RECESSION AND STAGFLATION
by Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr. and Sudha R. Shenoy*
Part A
I. INTRODUCTION
We begin'by referring to what is possible the major macroeconomic
problem - both for analysis and for policy - facing the Western econo
mics today; namely, the reasons why the supposedly mild inflations of
the two decades following the Second World War, have now turned into the
far more intractable "stagflation" besetting theorist and policy-maker
alike.
We then consider three possible "diagnoses" or major analytical
standpoints offered: the Keynesian; the monetarist (as represented
chiefly in Professor Friedman's writings); and (very briefly) the "psy
chological" (which is represented on both sides of the Atlantic, one
-'nots^ble representative being Professor Lord Robbins).
We hope to show that all three have one serious common failing;
they all ignore the real side of the economy and hence the real malad
justments introduced by a monetary policy that interferes with economic
coordination. All three views implicitly assume, on the other hand,
that the real side of the economy is always in long-term equilibrium;
they see money as influencing only the price-"level". We further hope
to jjhow that such views belong essentially to the anive early stage of
economic though, when the structure of output and the influence of
prices on production had not been fully worked out, and attention was
*The authors are, respectively, Assistant Professor of Economics, Iowa
State University (USA) and Lecturer in Economics, University of Newcastle,
New South Wales (Australia).
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directed towards the problems raised by varying money streams inpinging
on a rigid price and output structure.
We then proceed to an extensive exposition of a major alternative
analysis - that derived from the "Austrian" school of economic thought,
and more especially from the writings of Professor Hayek. Here we hope
to indicate how a Hayekian analysis of the effects of monetary changes
on the structure of prices and outputs enables us to delve beneath the
monetary surface to the underlying real phenomena, bringing out the real
misallocations resulting from a discoordinating monetary system.
Before we begin we feel we ought to say that although we consider
here only these three alternative, non-AuStrian views outlined, this
does not mean, of course, that we feel that all possible alternatives to
the Austrian standpoint have been covered. For instance, we do riot go
into the extensive neo-Ricardian critiques of the current orthodoxy
advanced by Professors Joan Robinson and Nicholas Kaldor and Mr. Piero
Sraffa, since we see these criticisms rather as part of a more general
attack on subjectivist-marginalist economics. Nor do we consider in
detail the recent work done by Professors Glower and Leijonhufvud, partly
because we feel a certain sympathy for their views, and indeed consider
our work to be complementary in some degree. We would argue, however,
that Professor Hayek's theory focused on certain important features of
cyclical disturbances that have been ignored by virtually all writers,
in the area.
II. From Inflation to Stagflation
The 1939-45 war marked a great watershed in the appearances of the
problems faced by macroeconomic policy in the developed countries. In
the inter-war years, policy had had to cope with, initially, a "typical"
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cycle (which was followed by what was taken to be a stable expansion in
the 1920's), and then by a depression of unprecedented intensity and
length. But it seemed that after 1945, the problem was exactly the oppo
site: that of gently (and later, ore rapidly) rising prices. In eleven
major developed countries,^ prices declined - if they did at all - in
only one or two years in the early 1950's, and these declines were negli
gible. • Price indices remained stable for some years in many of these
countries. But such periods of relative stability were outnumbered by
years of rising prices, so that in effect, prices have been rising more
or less steadily ever since the end of the Second World War.
Until recently, output generally rose pari passu with prices. Indeed,
the EEC countries, together with the outstanding examples of Israel and
Japan, were generally extolled for their economic growth record (in rela-
2
tion tO' such "slow growers" as the UK).
However, of late .two ominous sysmptoms have manifested themselves:
firstly, rates of price increase have themselves increased, so that most
developed countries now find it common for price level increases,to run
well into double figures, and rates of increase in output have begun to
slacken. Unemployment percentages, at historic lows ever since the late
1940's, have begun creeping upward again: and every attempt to reduce
the rate of price increase brings fresh upward jumps in unemployment and
in excess capacity in industry. Most OECD countries now find unemployment
lurks much closer to the inflationary surface. OECD forecasts describe
the price situation as "worrying" and report that although price inflation
continues at historically high rates (in excess of 12 per cent per annum
in early 1974), growth continues to decelerate (i.e. aggregate demand has
dropped substantially in relation to supply), "Over the last few years
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unemployment seems to have rise in relation to demand presisures" and the
"unemployment rate at the peak of the boom is higher than at earlier
peaks ..."3
The UK is perhaps a prime example of this "staglfationist" dilemma,
which in-many respects is far shatper there than elsewhere. UK retail
prices have risen in every year since 1945, with no exception - unlike
other countries, the UK never experienced any year in which the retail
price index fell or even remained steady. Growth rates remained low in
relation to growth rates achieved in the EEC. Attempts to raise the
growth rate regularly ran into pajmients problems - the well-known "stop-go"
cycle. Here too, the interval between "'go*' ahd "stop"' (or vice .versa)
has shortened - most recently (as of this writing) the Chancellor of the
Exchequer felt obliged to introduce "reflationary" measures hardly two
months after a "deflationary" Budget. This happened because in the UK
more than in any other developed country, increases in the rate of price
increase are now combined not merely with a low rate of growth in output
but with a zero or even a negative growth rate. The retail price index
broke into double figures well before any other developed country; and
even.before this happened, the retail price index began climbing well
ahead of output. And now (late 1974) the price increase shows every sign
of continuing into the 20 per cent range, while output continues to slacken.
An inflationary depression in the 1980*s is a not. unimaginable prospect
for the UK,^
What went wrong? Why has the gently rising price level of the
1950*s and the 1960*s now given way to double figure increases - which
scarcely anyone expected to happen? Why does unemployment rear its head
with- every slackening of the rate of price increase?
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III, The Keynesian Diagnosis
Many Keynesians view the post-1945 situation as .one of "cost infla
tion", i.e. of rising cost levels pushing up the price level,-with a
passive monetary system furnishing the necessary finance,^ Costs deter
mine prices, the "active" variable, the money supt)ly adapts "passively",6
Attempts to control the supply of money, rather than controlling costs
directly, must create unemployment without reducing prices, since costs
continue to rise. However, if costs can be controlled directly, e.g.
by incomes policies or some variant thereof, it would be.possible to com
bine both full employment and a stable price level.^ And the 1930's are
seen almost universally, not, of course, by the Keynesidiis alone, as an
awful example of the results of not expanding money income and expenditure
o
sufficiently to restore full employment.
The Keynesian view is thus essentially the epitome of the macro- -
approach. The Keynesian treatment of interest rates is one instance of
the implied neglect of the microstructure of relative prices and outputs
which actually obtains in reality. The interest rate - or market spectrum
of interest rates - is the closest approach in macroeconomics to anything
like a price. Of course, in the one-or-two-commodity world usually
treated in macro models, changes in interest rates have; - ex hvpothesi -
0
no micro implications. But the Keynesian approach offers us no theory
of interest rates whatsoever. What we have instead is an analysis of
changes in the rate at which the money stream enters the money market -
which may give us an hypothesis for short-run changes in market interest
rates, but gives us no theory of interest. As Professor D. H. Robertson
puts it, in his classic characterisation of Kejmes* liquidity preference
theory: ->
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Thus the rate of interest is what it is because it is expected to
become other than it is; if it is not expected to become other than
it is, there is nothing left to tell us why it is what it is. The
organ which secretes it has been amputated. And yet it somehow
still exists - a grin without a cat.^^
In the Keynesiari macro approach, then, prices remain completely
rigid, in both absolute and relative terns, throughout the analysis.
Changes in the structure of relative prices are ignored - indeed, the
analysis often explicitly assumes that prices remain always "at their
historic levels".So too the structure of output is considered to be
irrelevant; indeed, the Keynesian concept may be said to be that of full
unemployment - i.e. the implicit assumption that all goods and services
are available in abundance, so that output ahd e!tii)loynlerifc can be increased
in all firms simultaneously. Or to put this point slightly differently,
the "level" of unemployment and excess capacity at the bottom of the
cycle, is assumed to be uniform throughout the economy. The substantial
variations, in both unemployment and excess capacity, as among different
firms, "industries" and regions, are either not seen within the Keynesian
framework or disregarded, as of no analytical significance.
In such a scheme, then, the "level" of output and employment are
dependent solely on the level of monetary expenditure. The supply side
is left out of the picture altogether; and, as just mentioned, the concen
tration on levels of utilization (of labour and other factors) implies
that on the real side there is a constant equilibrium, in the structure
of output. ^
IV. The Monetarist Position
At the other extreme - seemingly - we have Professor Friedman and
the monetarists. Yet Professor Firedman, too, interprets the historical
experience of the 1920's and 1930's (in the U.S.) in purely monetary
- 7 -
tenns. For him too, as we shall see, the "supply" side of the economy is
12
always in long-run equilibrium; there is no real discoordination.
In considering value, we were only concerned with causes which
acted upon particular commodities apart from the rest., Causes
which affect all commodities alike do not act upon values.
But in considering the relation between goods and money, it is
with the causes that operate upon all goods whatever that we
are especially concerned. We are comparing goods of all sorts
on one side, with money on the other side, as things to be
exchanged against each other.
This quotation from J, S. Mill represents essentially the monetarist
approach. For Mill, as for most of the classical economists, money
affects only spending in general. Pricing - the determination of "value" -
is not affected by a monetary disturbance. Mill analyzed changes in the
quantity of money only in terras of the resulting discrepancy between
actual and desired cash balances (not in these terms, of course). The
14
real side is untouched.
Our picture of classical nineteenth century economic thought tends
to be dominated, naturally enough, by Mill and Ricardo. But neither was
particularly distinguished as a monetary theorist. Their dominance has,
however, overshadowed other important English monetary contributions of
the time (e.g. that of Henry Thornton).
Monetarism has hardly advanced beyond the classical position (and
so, not surprisingly, the classicals can sound quite "modern"). In his
analysis of some specific problems in microeconomics, Professor Friedman
does adopt what is basically the outlook of methodological individualism.
But in his monetary thoery (and in that of others of the same school) we
find, quite inconsistently, an aggregative analysis, utilizing holistic
macro constructs that are treated as if they interact directly (whereas
of course in fact they do not). This procedure ignores entirely the
microeconomic pricing process which actually determines the real structure
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of prices and output. Monetarism then, does not differ in its fundamental
approach from other brances of orthodox economics. A market economist
is distinguished by his adherence to the principles of methodological
individualism; he analyzes economic problems in terms of the effects of
a given change on the expected costs and benefits facing transactors.
A market economist is thus led to analyze (among other things) the market
process and price interrelationships > Whatever position Professor
Friedman may have adopted on other and non-monetary issues, in this
respect at least, he is not a market economist.
Professor. Friedman argues that real prices determine real magnitudes •
i.e. the economic system is always in long-tun real eqiiilibrium, as
described in the Walrasian system of equations. Real forces thus deter
mine real income, while monetary forces determine nominal income, with
the price-level as the joint outcome of the two. (Such an approach
differs but little from the older views of Professor Irving Fisher; it
must therefore be open to all the criticisms directed against these
earlier views. However, to continue:) To the foregoing. Professor
Friedman appends a short run adjustment process
"... in which the rate of adjustment in a variable is a function
of the discrepancy between the measured and the anticipated value
of the variable or its rate of change, as well, perhaps of other
variables or their rates of change.
Professor Friedman hypothecates such an adjustment process because
for him the key question of monetary theory is the reaction to a discre
pancy between the nominal quantity of money supplied and the nominal
quantity demanded. Monetary expansion, then, affects only the price-
level - there are no real maladjustments; while depressions are (very
largely, if not solely) the outcome of a decline in the stock of money.
True, in the transition from a rising to a stable price level, there may
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well be, almost unavoidably, some transitional decline in output and
employment, as money prices adjust themselves to the reduced rate of
increase in the stock of money. But provided this reduction is gradual
and not abrupt," there need be no very great rise in unemployment, or fall
in output. A monetary expansion, on the other harid, simply reverses this
process: initially, as the money supply expands and prices rise, wages
(and other costs) fail to rise (because the information has not yet
spread throughout the econon^^) and profits increase. Hence output and
employment expand - tenqjorarily. Once (nominal) wages and other costs
are bid up in line with the new price level, profits shrink back to their
"normal" level, and unemployment also rises to its "normal", level, as
I
determined by the real elements in the situation. There is no real mis-
allocation anywhere. The pattern of output is untouched. If we wish to
push unemployment below its "natural" level, and expand the money supply
to this end, larger and larger increases will become necessary, as the
system adjusts to the rises in money prices. But a serious' recession of
depression need not result, since monetary expansion creates no real
distortions, and the banking system is now geared to prevent any serious
Hft
deflations in the stock of money.Consistently with these views,
Professor Friedman sees no real consequences to the monetary expansion
of the 1920*s, as the price-level remained stable, while in the early
1930's the substantial decline in output and employment in the US may be
debited directly to the substantial contraction in the stock of money
in the years 1929-32,
In other words, the M>netarist position may be restated as follows:
in real terms, prices are always at their long-term equilibrium level;
monetary changes affect only their nominal height; money has no real
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effects. Given that Professor Kricdnian sees the underlyinj; reality as
t
being described by the long-run Walrasian equations, such a view is only
reasonable - since long-run equilibrium by definition excludes any real
disequilibrium.' Nor can Professor Friedman consistently superimpose
imperfect anticipations onto a system in which all expectations are con
sistent and met, and expect to obtain a very conherent results. Equally,
in the ^ hoc "adjustment process" which Professor Friedman postulates,
he fails quite to distinguish between price changes that coordinate pro
duction and those that do the opposite.' In any case, general equilibrium
equations, being solely definitional, leave the whole market process
entirely out of consideration - indeed, such equations can ,teli us pre-
I
cisely nothing about such an intertemporal process.But it is such
interrelated price changes that actually guide production o^ver time.
The aggregative "macro" constructs on which Professor Friedman and
the monetarists rely in their analysis, are common to other orthodox •
economists (including and more especially the Keynesians - a point which
Professor Friedman now acknowledges). In relying on these constructs
the monetarists appear to be unaware of the real effects of money on the
economic system - its effects on individual prices and price interrla-
tionships, and hence on the structure of outputs (and of employments).
In thus ignoring the structure of production, and the influences of
prices on production, the monetarists share a crucial deficiency, common
not only to the Keynesians, but indeed to the reference framework of the
current orthodoxy. The monetarists no less than the Keynesians thus lay
themselves open to the criticism that such thinking takes "us back to the
pre-scientific stage of economics, when the whole working of the price
mechanism was not yet understood, and only the problems of the impact of
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a varying money stream on a supply of goods and services with"given
prices aroused interest."^®
V. The Psychological View
Finally, a brief mention must be made of a third viewpoint which
stresses the role of inflationary expectations in creating the stagfla-
21tionist dilemma. This view is very widespread - e.g. both Lord Robbins
22and the Wall Street Journal may be found subscribing to it. In this
view, as particular rates or price increase come to be expected, people
anticipate these increases by incorporating them into the prices they
demand for the goods and services they produce. The problem then is to
frustrate these inflationary expectations, and reduce the anticipations
of price increases to "reasonable" levels.
•Here, too, the implicit assumption is that there is no real dis-
coordination anywhere on the real side of the economy. Money has no
effect on the structure of outputs or indeed on relative prices, and price
relationships. The psychological view by itself lacks any theoretical
under pinnings. It can be - and is - appended to other theories (e.g.,




As we have seen, the common deficiency in the Keyneslan and Monetar
ist approaches is their neglect of the microeconomics of business cycles.
And as others have noted, it is doubtful whether the existence of money
can be accounted for in a Walrasian framework. In any case, both Keynes-
ians and monetarists alike fail to find any place for money in the pricing
process: money is given no role in determining money prices.
The specifically Austrian contribution to monetary theory was two
fold: firstly, it emphasized the role of money in the pricing process, and
incorporated money - or, more precisely, changes in the stream of money
payments ~ into the determination of relative prices. Secondly, it ana
lyzed the effects of such money-induced relative price changes on the
time-structure of production - i.e., the capital structure.
Menger provided the theoretical framework for explaining why a
23
medium of exchange was used. Wicksell drew attention to the failure of
the classical quantity theory to explain how changes in the money supply
24
affected prices. Von Mises, building on Menger and Wicksell, showed more
completely how money could be integrated into general economic theory. He
went on to outline a theory of cyclical fluctuations in which monetary dis-
25
turbances led to real misallocations. Professor Hayek built on the
theories of Menger, Bohm-Bawerk, Wicksell and von Mises to amplify and
expand the "Austrian" monetary tradition, especially in capital and busi-
26
ness cycle theory. We examine that tradition in what follows.
/
Monetary Expansion. Pricing, and Resource Allocation
Monetary changes are not neutral - they do not affect all prices
uniformly, changing merely their nominal height but leaving price
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relationships unaltered. In reality money does not enter the economy
via a helicopter or via a simple uniform change in all money balances -
the sort of simpliste example so dear to so many textbook writers. Rather,
newly-created money always enters the economy at a specific point, and is
spent first on certain specific goods, before gradually working through
the system. Thus some prices and expenditures are altered first, and
other prices and expenditures, later. So long' as the original ^netary
change Is maintained, so long will this monetary "pull" on price interre
lationships persist.
Professor Hayek has linkened the effects of money on pricing to the
process of pouring a viscous liquid (honey in his example) into a vessel:
There will, of course, be a tendency for it to spread to an
even surface. But if the stream [of honey] hits the surface
at one point, a little mound will form there from which the
additional matter will slowly spread outward. Even after we
have stopped pouring in more, it will take some time until
the even surface will be fully restored. It will, of course,
not reach the height which the top of the mound had reached
when the inflow had stopped. But as long as we pour at a
constant rate, the mound will preserve its height relative
to the surrounding pool.^^
Resource allocation cannot be left unchanged as a result of these
relative price changes. At the point at which the new money, enters the
economy, prices will rise relative to prices elsewhere. The pattern of
outputs will bei altered correspondingly. Monetary expansion also prevents
some prices from falling, that might otherwise have fallen. Thus some
businesses make "profits" that would have made losses, and workers are
employed in jobs they would have left for others. Another result of the
monetary expansion is that more new businesses, and different kinds of
businesses than otherwise are started. Firms are also led to embark on
new ind/or different lines of production. In short, the pattern of
expenditures, of resource allocations, and, above all, of relative prices,
are all changed by monetary expansion.
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Initially such expansion generally takes the form of an increase in
bank credit. (Governments could simply print extra currency, but they
usually prefer less obvious methods of reaching this objective and thus
bridging the chronic gap between fiscal incomes and expenditures).
Increased bank' credit reduces interest rates below the level they would
otherwise have reached. The overall pattern of expenditures is thereby
altered: investment expenditures rise relative to consumption expenditures
and to savings, the increase being measured approximately by the increase
in the noney supply.
Monetary expansion thus leads to a discoordination between saving
and investment plans. The Keynesian and the monetarist would find little
to quarrel with in the analysis at this point: the former would agree
that if planned investment exceeded planned savings, incomes and output,
and possibly prices, would rise; the latter would say that aii increase
in the stock of money would raise incomes and prices, and perhaps output.
The "Austrian** analysis however goes further - to detail the changes in
the pattern of expenditures and hence in the pattern of outputs, resulting
from the consequent changes in relative prices.
Monetary Expansion and the Production Structure
As we have just seen, in crudely aggregative terms, monetary expansion
leads to a drop in interest rates and a rise in investment expenditures
relative to consumption expenditures. I.e., a decline in the uniform
rate of discount will raise the demand-price schedule for durable capital
goods - more so, for the more durable goods - in relation to the demand-
price schedule for current consumption services. But this is only the
very beginning of the story; the effect on capital durability is a partial
effect.
- 15 -
There has been no change in the "supply" of capital goods (and we ,
shall see the implications of this in the course of the discussion).
Capital is not a homogenous stock, but an interconnected structure of
interrelated capital goods. By disarranging price signals, the effect
of monetary expansion is to throw this structure out of co-ordination.
28
In the Hayekian view, production is seen as a series of "stages",
beginning with final consumption, and extending through to stages systemat
ically and successively further removed from this final stage. Factor
services are applied to the unfinished products moving through these
i
stages. In other words, production consists of a series of interrelated
processes in which heterogenous capital goods are grouped in specific
combinations, together with land and labour services.
Capital goods usually, and land and labour to some extent, are
specific to particular stages of production. Capital goods are thus not
in general homogenous and substitutable; they are heterogenous and comple
mentary, and usable only in specific combinations: e>g*> a machine from
a shoe factory cannot be combined at random with a machine from an automo-
29bile plant to produce some third product. More generally, if capital
investments (such as shoe factories or authomobile plants) are to add
more to final output than any other capital combination, they must fit into
an integrated production structure completed to the final consumption
stage - i.e., they must fit into an interlinked series of complementary
30
Investments.
The increased bank credit flowing into the system at depressed
interest rates alters the relative profitability of capital invested in
different stages; the streams of quasi-rents accruing to the various
capital goods are changed; and these goods are rearranged into different
capital combinations.
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j At the lower interest rates, certain formerly unprofitable invest
ments become profitable. Additional bank credit does not produce addi
tional labour knd land services; hence the new investments must necessarily
use relatively less labour. Because there is more money available and
interest rates are lower, factor rental prices are bid up relative to
'31
product prices - i.e., real factor costs increase. Hence entrepreneurs
try to adopt less labour intensive (i.e., more "capitalistic") production
methods. Demand for raw materials also increases.
Conversely, certain formerly profitable investments now become
unprofitable: returns decline on capital goods that are usable only in
relatively more labour-intenseive methods, and that cannot readily be
adapted to the use of less labour. Demand for the different sorts of
capital goods depends on relative factor costs and on the expected returns
from using the machines to produce other products. Firms producing capital
goods geared to unprofitable capital combinations find on the one hand
that they face increased factor costs, while demand for their machines is
falling off. Hence these firms (or lines of production) contract, while
other firms producing goods adapted to the newer, more profitable capital
combinations find demand rising and increase their output.
Changing price signals reduce profits on production for current
consumption while raising profits on production for future consumption,
32
thus altering profits on the different capital combinations involved.
Returns decline in production stages nearer consumption, while returns
increase in stages furthest from final consumption. Nonspecific resources
are thus shifted from the former to the latter: output of consumer goods
declines, while the pattern of production of capital goods is so altered
as to now produce goods that fit into a production structure extending
through more stages than previously.
- 17 -
I
In order that these Investments may all be completed down to the
final consumption stage, it is necessary that the requisite resources
continue to be .released from consumption - i.e., that a decline in consump
tion output be maintained until the new production structure is completed.
It must be remembered that because of intertemporal complementarity, a
machine whose usefulness depends on the construction of additional capital
goods will be economically useless if the requisite resources are diverted
elsewhere (i.e., to the production of consumption output in this case).
In order to complete all the capital combinations appropriate to an
extended production structute, capital goods are now required which,
given the intensity of consumption demand, are not available.
The Self-Reversabilitv of Monetary Changes
But as a result of the monetary expansion, factor-owners have been
\
receiving increased money incomes. And there has been no change in the
rate of saving oiit of income. As these incomes are spent, the increased
consumption expenditure meets an attenuated supply of consumer goods.
Prices of consumer goods now begin rising, relative to the prices of
unfinished products, especially those furthest away from the final con
sumption stage. The above process is row reversed; returns rise in
stages nearer consumption, while returns decline concomitantly in stages
furthest from consumption. Non specific resources are once more drawn
back into the production of consumer goods. All those capital goods
intended for a different production structure have now to be readapted,
to fit another, "shorter" structure, with concomitant losses and unemploy
ment. These losses are particularly heavy on those capital goods most
suited only to a "longer" structure. In summary, the attempted extension
of the production structure cannot be completed, for lack of resources.
- 18 -
i
Monetary expansion began by lowering interest rates. Entrepreneurs,
misled by the uncoordinated price signals, attempted to reduce all
marginal rates of return to the same level. But In attempting to do so,
they actually drove ^ ^ post returns on some goods, to levels higher
than these Interest rates. Monetary expansion thus Induces dlsproportlon-
alltles In the production of capital goods, that are revealed In the
"depression": there Is overproduction In some lines, underproduction
In others.
Capital goods that are profitable to produce only at the lower rates
of Interest have been overproduced. They have been overproduced because
inappropriate combinations of capital goods have been selected as the
result of the price signals generated by the hypothesized monetary policy.
Capital goods appropriate to the real factors (including transactors'
time preferences or propensity to consume out of income) have been under
produced.
From the above analysis, It is clear that aggregation of Individual
investment-demand curves Into one aggregate-Investment curve, has no price*
theoretic foundation. Demand for any capital good depends on its position
in the production structure and the profitability of integrating it into
different and varying capital combinations. Equally, changes in Interest
rates affect prices and supplies, not merely of produced goods used in
further production, but also of land and labour services. In short,
monetary expansion affects not merely "the" interest rate - it alters
an enormous complex of price-cost margins and resource allocations;
"'the' interest rate" is merely an extremely clumsy and misleading short
hand phrase covering this vast intricate web of interrelationships.




pattern of production, a change which must eventually be modified and
reversed. Initially, the effects of the expansion may appear to be bene
ficent, as money incomes rise* But is is now that the unsustainable
misallocations are being made: as prices of unfinished products rise,
relative to consumer goods prices. As the money permeates through the-
system, this relative price change is reversed, and consumer goods prices
rise. The cluster of misallocations now stands revealed, in the form of
losses and unemployment, additional to those necessary for the continuous
adaptation of production to changing circumstances. More specifically,
resources become unen^loyed in stages furthest from consumption. This
unerhployment id reduced as consumer goods production picks up. Continuous
nunetary expansion can only perpetuate this cyclical dis-coordination in
the capital structure, and thus raise losses and unemplojnaient above the
level they would otherwise have reached.
Such expansion cannot prevent real scarcities from manifesting
themselves. Prices may be initially and temporarily influenced in a
direction opposite to that of the underlying real factors. But it is
not as if there exist an infinite array of prices consistent with the real
factors. Prices reflect not only monetary disturbances but also real
influences^-tastes, technology, and above all, real scarcities.
And so, although monetary expansion has very real misallocating
33
effects, these "purely" monetary changes are self-reversing. Most con
temporary economists would be chary of accepting this proposition. This
reluct^ce stems, we feel, from the current approach which assumes that
output always has its equilibrium composition, and which treats money as
determining only the nominal heights of prices that are always at their
real equilibrium levels. If money has no real affects whatsoever* then
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there are none to reverse. And there are no mlsallocations to correct.
A monetary disturbance thus differs substantially from, e.g., a
tax-arid-subsidy scheme. Taxes and subsidies do ideed reduce outputs of
the taxed commodities, while stimulating production of the subsidized
ones. But there is no purely economic reason why taxes and subsidies,
once Imposed, need ever be removed. These disturbances merely lead to a
new and stable allocation of resources, which persists so long as the
taxes and subsidies continue. Economic behavior is coordinated in the
tax cum subsidy case. There is no self-reversal.
Price Expectations and Resource Allocation
We have seen that mOtietary expansion systetiiatically transmits mis
information through the economic system, by moving prices in a direction
opposite to that of the real factors. However, as expansion continues,
price Increases come to be expected . Real- scarcities and changed
price expectations together serve to reduce somewhat those profit margins
widened by purely monetary factors. If entrepreneurs find that ^ post
rates of return on certain goods (l.e, consumer goods in general) are
persistently higher than were expected originally, then they will come to
anticipate this; Entrepreneurs will be willing to pay more to hire factors
to produce those goods whose profit margins have proved to be greatest.
Factor costs thus Increase for the producers of the capital goods appro
priate to the lower rate of Interest. Likewise, as entrepreneurs switch
production methods, the demand for those very capital goods will declineo
Hence even with a continuous expansion, we have the onset of the reces
sionary s3miptoms of a corrective reallocation. In these circumstances,
if policy-makers wish to raise apparent profit margins (of the expanded
capital goods-producing firms) to their previously inflated level, they
- 21 -
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must accelerate the monetary expansion. The ultimate limit to such a
monetary policy is the abandonment of that currency as a medium of
exchange:.
But even if monetary expansion proceeds at a constant rate, price
expectations and real scarcities by no means obviate all the dis-coordi
nating effects of such a continuous disturbance. This is because its
impact on individual prices is unpredictable, and hence profit margins
on particular capital goods will continue to be higher (or lower) than
expected, because of purely monetary influences; some capital dislocation
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will thus continue.
The Inadequacies of a Purely Monetary Approach
We may how see the inadequacies of the Keynesian approach which
argues that when there is excess capacity and unemployed labour in both
capital and consumption goods industries, credit expansion permits higher
employment and output. If the excess capacity is idle because it has
beeii malinvested and hence cannot be fitted into the capital structure,
the increased credit can only add to these misallocations and thus create
today further potential future idleness for both capital and labour
resources. As Professor Hayek has incisively noted:
"... it has of course never been denied that employment can be
rapidly increased, and a position of 'full employment' achieved
in the shortest possible time by means of monetary expansion -
least of all by those economists whose outlook has been influenced
by the experience of a major inflationi All that has been con
tended is that the kind of full employment which can be created
in this way is Inherently unstable, and that to create employment
by these means is to perpetuate fluctuations. There may be
desperate situations in which it may indeed be necessary to
increase employment at all costs, even if it be only for a short
period... But the economist should not conceal the fact that to
aim at the maximum of employment which can be achieved in the
short run by means of monetary policy is essentailly the policy
of the desperado who has nothing to lose and everything to gain
from a short breathing space.
22 -
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If many contemporary economists refer to recessions or depressions
today, it is to concentrate on the purely monetary aspects. Thus Professor
Friedman argues that "the American economy is depression-proof": a drastic
monetary decline, on the lines of 1930-33, is now impossible because of
37
deposit insurance, and banking and fiscal changes. Frofesisor Paul
McCracken concurs that economic management "can probably avert a major and
a generalized depression" - financial collapses on the 1930^s scale have
been so rare that it would be premature to anticipate something similar.
(However, he sternly warns companies and financial institutions against
38the risks of unwise financing policies). Professor Harry Johnson states
that it is a "virtual certainty that nations will never again allow a
massive world recession to develop" since "their economists'would know
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better than to accept disaster as inevitable or inexplicable." Professor
Haberler entitles the foreword to the 1964 edition of his Prosperity and
Depression. "Why Depressions are Extinct", He cites the strength of the
U.S. financial structure; deposit insurance; refusal to tolerate a whole
sale deflation; and the powerful built-in stabilizer of the government
budget. By preventing a decline in expenditure, this "has proved to be
a very powerful brake on deflationary spirals and has been a major factor
in keeping depressions mildV. Outlining the main features of business
cycles, he says, "A very significant fact is that the wholesale price
level almost always rises during the upswing and falls during the downswing,
and the money values - payrolls, aggregate profits etc. - always go with
the cycle. This proves that changes in effective demand, rather than
changes in supply, are the proximate cause of the cyclical movement in
real output and employment,"
None of these statements deal with the real misallocations resulting
from monetary expansion, or with the counteracting forces then set in
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motion. As we have seen above, such counteracting-forces - i.e., reces
sionary symptoms - may appear to be (teii5)orarily) fended off only if
monetary expansion proceeds at an accelerating rate. If an expansion
proceeds at a steady rate, recessionary symptoms appear nonetheless; and
I
their onset is the more rapid if the expansion decelerates.
Stagflation, and Monetary Acceleration
In either case, it is the investment goods industries furthest from
consumption that feel the pinch. If the monetary expansion continues
steadily, then, with the relative increase in consumer goods prices,
firms nearer consumption bid away nonspecific resources from these
industries, which now find that their costs rise faster than their selling
prices. If the expansion slows down, then there is an unambiguous decline
in monetary demand for the investment projects begun at the lower interest
rates. But even while unemployment and malinvested "excess capacity"
appear in stages furthest from consumption, the Incomes generated in the
expansion are still working through the system. Consumer goods industries
will maintain and even increase their demand for factor services: whereas
at the beginning of the expansion these industries were outbid for factor
services, they now face both an increase in demand and an increasing supply
of nonspecific factors, as these are released by firms further from
consumption. Consumer prices may well continue to rise; but much depends
on how rapidly output can be increased in these industries, and nonspecific
resources shifted back into consumer goods production. Mitigation of the
level of unemployment also depends on both these elements.
From this analysis it is clear that attempts to maintain inflated
capital values and incomes in the capital goods industries most affected
would perpetuate the misallocation. Undoubtedly, there will be political
- 24 -
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pressure to do this: the Incomes of specific factors are most strongly
affected by changes In demand for their services. But reflation - accel-
I
erated expansion - will lead to further maladjustments. Moreover, given
the continuous steep rise In consumer prices, there will also undoubtedly
be an opposing pressure from groups whose Incomes lag behind'. This
pressure will often take the form of controls on prices (particularly those
of consumer goods). Consumer price controls can only exacerbate the
situation. By reducing returns in the consumer goods Industries they
Intensify the shortage of consumption goods.
As we have seen. It is the rise in consumption expenditures which
precipitates the market pressures for resource reallocatlon. Attempts
to stimulate consumption would Intensify these reallocatlve pressures.
A rise in voluntary saving, on the other hand, would help to salvage some
of the inallnvestments. But these mlsallocatlons were created by the
monetary expansion; so long as expansion continues, so long will the
capital structure be dislocated, and ma1Investments arise, only some of
which are salvageable.
To summarize: Under the Impact of a monetary disturbance, prices
will transmit misinformation. The revelation of this misinformation and
its correction constitute a recession. The "abnormal" rise In losses
and unemployment is the counterpart to the mlsallocatlons created by the
misinformation. In short, monetary expansion arid recession are inseperable.
If the expansion is halted, the recession is precipitated rapidly. It
is extensive and deep. But once the readjustment is completed:, and a
sustainable pattern of output and employment established, there need be
no further allocative difficulties and certainly no currency depreciation.
- 25 -
If monetary expansion contlnutes, recessionary symptoms of greater
and greater Intensity begin appearing. But the readjustment will not be
wholly completed. The pattern of output and employment Is continuously
dislocated. Eventually, losses and unemplo3rment persist In rising, and
.42
continue at every higher levels, despite the continuing expansion.
If the expansion Is repeatedly accelerated to overcome the recession.,,
the monetary outcome Is obvious. Such a situation may well eventuate
unintentionally, as the cumulative outcome of separate successive decisions
to expand the money supply In the face of recession. The economists
quoted above assure us that our financial system will never permit another
Great Depression. Can they also assure us that It will never permit the
opposite?
43
Professor F. A. Samuelson seems to think not. He points out that
monetary expansion occurs In response to "populist" pressures to "avoid
policies that would worsen shortun unemployment and stagnation problems".
He therefore sees the outlook as one of "... creeping or trotting Inflation,
The problem Is how to keep the creep or trot from accelerating. This
Includes the challenge of finding new macroeconomic policies beyond
conventional fiscal and monetary policies that will enable a happier com
promise between the evils of unemployment and of price inflation." But
he stresses that "a Draconian policy of insisting upon stable prices at
whatever cost to current unemplojmient and shortrun growth" would be a
"costly investment in fighting inflation", since he sees no guarantee
"that even in the longest run the benefits to be derived from militant
®ritl"inflatlonary policies don't carry excessive costs as far as average
levels of unemployment and growth are concerned". He goes on to warn,
"... mankind at this stage of the game can ill afford to make irreversible
- 26 -
academic experiments whose outcomes are necessarily doubtful" and whose
implementation would exacerbate political tensions. He is confident such
an anti-inflation policy "will assuredly never be followed",. '
Truly inflation leaves us holding a "tiger by the tail":
"Now we have an inflation borne properity which depends" for its
continuation on continued inflation. If prices rise less than
expected, then a depressing effect is exerted on the ecoziomy ...
... to slow down inflation produces a recession. We now have a
tiger by the tail: how long can this inflation continue? If the
tigher (of inflation) is freed, he will eat us up; yet if he runs
faster and faster while we desperately hold on, we are still










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































^ Range of Av. ann. rates of change (percent) ' ,
(a) 1953-57 consumers' goods: -0.3 to 2.7 (Inc. prod. 4.0)
producers' goods: 1,7 to 6,7 (retail prices 3.6)
(b) 1958-62 consumers' goods: -0.4 to 1.6 (ind. prod, 2,6)
producers' goods: -0.^ to 2.0 (retail prices 2,5)
(c) 1963-67 consumers' goods: 0,4 to 2,5 (ind, prod, 3.4)
producers' goods: 1,1 to 3.1 (retail^prices 3.3)
(d) 1969-72 consumers' goods: 4.6 to 6.8 (ind. prod. 1,7)
producers' goods: 4,6 to 8,7 (retail prices 7.1),
(1) Initially, (1953-57) producers' goods prices rose very much more
rapidly than consumer's goods prices. Then, in 1953^62, consumers'
goods prices began catching up; and the rate of incirease in Indus
trial production declined.
(2) In 1963-67. the price gap between consumers' and producers' goods
widened slightly: the rate of increase in industrial output rose
somewhat (but not to the 1953-57 level). But by 1969-72, consumers'
goods prices had once more acught up with producers' goods prices;
and the annual rate of increase in Industrial production had fallen
to one-half the 1963-67 level,
(3) The rate of increase in retail prices has been increasing since
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Range of Av. ann. rates of change (percent)
(a) 1953-56 consumers' goods: -0.7 to 3.0 (ind. prod. 4.5)
producers' goods: 1.3 to 6.9 (retail prices 3.5)
(b) 1969-72 consumers' goods: 4.6 to 6.8 (ind. prod. 1.7)
producers' goods: 4.6 to 8.7 (retail prices 7.1)
Between 1953-56 and 1969-72, the price gap between consumers' goods
and producers' goods narrowed drastically, the rate of Increase in retail
prices virtually doubled, while the rate of increase in industrial produc
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